



FRENCH PLANNING BRIEFING

GENERAL

The Planning Session is a streamlined reconstruction of a number of planning meetings of high command staffs, carried out over many months prior to the actual campaign.

BACKGROUND

France emerged in 1918 as the supreme military power in Europe. Its war machine was the greatest of all the powers and had enabled France to triumph. The cost however was considerable. The French nation suffered dreadfully in both material and human terms. Casualties in metropolitan France alone numbered 1,315,000 or 27 per cent of all men between the ages of eighteen and twenty seven, a higher rate than any other combatant nation. Population growth since the war and the German annexations means that Germany can now field many more men than France (seventy five million compared to forty million) can in the current conflict. France can however balance this by drawing on its considerable reserves of manpower in the colonies.

As a result of the last war being fought on French soil, industry in northern France was devastated and the cost of the damage is estimated at some 134 Billion gold Francs. It is a tribute to the indomitable French spirit that all this was rebuilt in just four short years. One can only speculate what could have been achieved in the years since the war had not the nation lost the cream of its youth in that terrible holocaust. It must never be allowed to happen that way again.

France's wartime allies have since proved unreliable in peacetime, seemingly lacking the resolve to make Germany pay the due post-war reparations and failing to support us when Germany re-occupied the left bank of the Rhine in 1936. This latter action particularly changed the European strategic situation, forcing France to once again consider the possibility of having to fight a war along the whole of the Northeastern frontiers with the inevitable damage to French territory that this would entail. The new King of the Belgians recinded the post-war Alliance in 1936 and declared neutrality in the misguided belief that the Germans will respect such a move and leave him in peace!

Among the important lessons learned from the Great War were that a future war must not be fought on French soil and that it must be strategically defensive in nature. The battle for Verdun and its epic ten month defence stirred the hearts of Frenchmen and the world and showed the fundamental strength of the defence. France and France alone stood against the might of the German army and bested it in bloody combat. The cost however

was enormous - over 400,000 casualties. Proper fortifications, at which France has excelled since the days of Vauban, enable a defence without such losses. To this end the Maginot line has been created at enormous cost to guard the border from Belgium to Switzerland. Adequately supported by field troops the line is impregnable. In addition to deterring an attack (and particularly preventing a surprise attack) the Maginot line will also serve to provide a shield behind which the army can fully mobilise and provide a defensive zone from which coordinated and carefully planned counter-attacks can be made. It is recognised though that the sheer cost of the Maginot line has required cuts elsewhere in defence spending.

More worrying are the ends of the line. In the south it is clear that a possible German advance through Switzerland cannot be disregarded after the ruthless behaviour of the Germans elsewhere. Fascist Italy may also prove a threat and the southern defences cannot be neglected.

Belgium's neutrality has dramatically complicated the situation in the north. It has not been possible to coordinate war plans with the Belgians since then (although informal contacts have occurred). The more serious consideration is that no advance can be made into Belgian territory until the Germans have invaded; to do otherwise might give the Germans an excuse to act before we are fully ready, and would bring our forces into conflict with the Belgian army whose twenty divisions are vital to the defeat of the German threat.

To ward against the twin threats to the north and south of the line fortifications have been recently extended in these areas. However, the damage that would be done to French industry in the north by extensive fort-building, together with the nature of the ground with its high water table makes the sort of deep fortifications necessary virtually impossible to build.

Spain would seem to pose little immediate problem as that country is still recovering from the civil war but cannot be entirely ignored since General Franco is beholden to Germany for its support during the conflict.

While during the political turmoil of the twenties and early thirties the rapid succession of short-lived governments and the temporary accession to power of the leftist popular front the army suffered long periods of neglect the situation has now changed dramatically. The growing menace of Fascist Germany and the incredible political successes of Hitler in respect of Austria, Czechoslovakia and the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union have served to awaken France to the efforts that are required.

In the face of a massive and swift programme of German re-armament (which has led the Deuxieme Bureau to conclude that the German army is now stronger than the French army) a considerable effort has been made to strengthen the French armed forces. In 1938 the rearmament programme provided for the production of 6,000 25mm and fifty-one 12-gun batteries of the matchless 47mm gun to provide a solid anti-tank base; fifty new groups of 105mm guns plus five groups of mechanised artillery for the armoured divisions to add a modern component to the French army. To complete its mechanisation the army ordered 5,000 armoured utility vehicles for the infantry and fifty battalions of infantry support tanks. Also ordered were twelve battalions of B tanks to equip two heavy 'breakthrough' armoured divisions; 325 excellent SOMUA tanks were ordered for the DLM's; 3,200 tanks altogether.

Following Germany's annexation of Austria the then Army Minister Daladier set in motion

another programme for twelve billion francs to provide 6,000 25mm automatic cannon to hold off low flying attacks; 480 90mm guns (comparable to the German 88) for defence at high altitudes.

Thus great strides have been made in replacing much of the obsolete equipment the army was forced to make do with during the twenties and early thirties. New and more powerful tanks have been introduced such as the Somua and Char B; the new 47mm anti-tank gun is now in full production. These are only a few of the examples of the changes which have been made to ensure that the French army remains the worthy successor to the fighting force which emerged victorious from the 1914-18 war.

Of particular benefit are two particular facets of the French army; a stable and unbroken military organisation which is able to draw on the experiences of the last war and a sound strategy which is an ideal combination of mobility, defence and counter-offensive.

After some debate concerning the proposal from Colonel de Gaulle to form a mobile professional army of 100,000 men at the expense of the rest of the army the tactical doctrine of the French armed forces has been recently summarised in the 1937 Army Instruction on the 'Tactical Employments of Major Units' which was written by General Georges and approved by the then Minister for the Army, Daladier. This document concludes that technical progress has not appreciably modified the tactical rules laid down by its predecessors. As previously the infantry are entrusted with the principle duty in battle. protected and accompanied by its own guns and by the guns of the artillery, and occasionally preceded by combat tanks and aviation it will conquer the ground, occupy the ground and organise and hold that ground. The infantry has a particularly dangerous task of outstanding glory. The development of anti-tank guns will result in the employment of tanks in the attack only after the protection and support of very powerful artillery (it will be remembered that many tanks came to grief before the power of the anti-tank gun during the Spanish Civil War). The bulk of the tanks will thus remain distributed among the infantry divisions.

The air force has also received considerable attention with large numbers of the most modern aircraft having been ordered in recent years to counteract what is undoubtedly a powerful German air force. This will increase the air force by some 16 fighter groups and 24 bomber groups bringing the total to thirty four and sixty respectively by April 1st 1941.

In summary then there are several basic tenets which any plan to defeat Germany must recognise:

- 1) Belgian and Dutch neutrality **cannot be violated** by the allied forces; we must await a German attack on Belgium and/or Holland before either country can be entered.
- 2) An advance into Belgium when permissible must be made **as deep as possible** so as to avoid at all costs any battle being fought in the industrially vital area of northern France.
- 3) It would be **madness** to throw away the advantage of the Maginot line by launching an offensive into Germany from this line, particularly as this will involve us in attacking the formidable new Siegfried Line.
- 4) The British forces in France must be encouraged to **maximise their involvement** in any fighting. The Germans can only be stopped in France - if France should fall, then how can Britain continue the fight alone? Britain should therefore be encouraged to contribute

100% to the coming fight.

5) This war will **not be resolved quickly** – therefore ensure that all resources are husbanded for the long term, especially aircraft. It would be disastrous if the bulk of the air force or armoured forces were chewed up in the first few weeks of combat with no reserves for later operations.

6) **Hold the line.** One of the things we learnt, above all, from the victories of the last war is that a continuous line must be maintained. This is a matter of doctrine and training and all infantry divisions will attempt to maintain a link with neighbouring divisions so that the line is maintained. The continuous line is essential to provide a secure jumping off point for powerful offensive operations conducted by reserves.

PLANNING OBJECTIVES

You have to come up with a plan for the successful defence of France.

The plan should only be in general terms, and should have the following information:

1. The initial deployment areas of the Armies in the order of battle. This can be shown on a deployment map provided.
2. The operational tasks of each Army - in the form of short orders for each Army Commander. It will not be necessary to specify divisional tasks. This will include:
 - a. Initial objectives and routes to those objectives. Note that strategic moves that are the subject of a prepared plan are always faster than unplanned manoeuvres.
 - b. Conditional statements - what to do if....(the Germans invade Switzerland for example).
 - c. Timings (how soon to start moving etc).
3. Decide on the deployment policy for the Air forces available in NE France including:
 - a. Initial target/defence priorities.
 - b. Any changes to deployment to air bases.
 - c. Initial allocation of air resources to Armies.
4. The location of un-allocated GHQ reserve divisions.

FRENCH ARMED FORCES

THE MAGINOT LINE

This defensive line stretches from Basle on the Swiss Frontier to Longwy, at the junction of the Belgian, Luxembourg and French frontiers. The strength and depth of the line varies, but for 120 km it consists of fortified regions guarding the two main invasion routes. One covering an assault aimed at Metz and Nancy, the other facing north to guard the plains of Lower Alsace. Facing directly east there are a number of lesser fortifications covering the wide river obstacle of the Rhine. Just behind the frontier the defences of the two fortified regions begin with a series of tank-proof obstacles and thick barbed wire. This is backed up by maisons fortes and pill-boxes. These advance posts will give warning of any attack and delay it. To the rear of these posts is a deep anti-tank ditch and then the underground casemates and forts which make up the backbone of the line.

Each casemate is protected by up to 3 metres of reinforced concrete, and contains rapid-firing anti-tank guns and machine guns firing out of underground slits with a wide 50° arc. There are also grenade throwers to dislodge enemy infantry that might manage to approach using dead ground. The 25-man garrison of the casemates live and sleep on a level still deeper underground. These positions are superbly camouflaged and blend completely in with their environment. The first an attack will know that they have encountered the line will be withering and destructive fire from an interlocking system of protected fire positions.

The real heart of the Line is the forts. These back up the casemate positions at an interval of every 5-8 km. Drawing on the great traditions of Vauban, our engineers have created a modern wonder of impregnable concrete and steel fortification. Troops live, eat, sleep, work and exercise for weeks completely self-contained within these forts. Electric trains whisk men from deep underground barracks and canteens to action in the gun turrets. Independent power stations give uninterrupted electric power. Powerful compressors supply air, and make the forts proof against poison gas attack. Immense stores of food, water, ammunition and fuel ensure that they can remain fully operational completely cut off from outside assistance for at least three months.

There are three different types of fort, the largest is Category 1. This has, typically, a garrison of 1200 men and contains 15-18 concrete 'blocks', each with many guns mounted in disappearing turrets and ranging from 37mm to 135mm calibre. Each fort is divided into two parts, connected by deep subterranean galleries, invulnerable to the largest bomb or shell, and varying between 400m to 2km in length. Even if one half of a fort should get knocked out, the other half can continue the fight, and bring down fire on its companion.

In total, the NE frontier and the Rhine has:

- 23 artillery forts
- 35 small infantry forts
- 295 casemates and interval blockhouses
- 70 interval shelters
- 14 armoured observation posts.

plus many minor fieldworks.

To prevent infiltration, interval troops are necessary. These are usually infantry divisions, complete with artillery which can be moved to counter the threat to any particular fort or group of forts.

This line is correctly known as the **Shield of France**. Any attacker will expend himself

uselessly against this impenetrable defensive barrier, giving the Field Army the time to mass for a final battle of destruction.

ARMY FIELD FORCES

Definitions:

- ACTIVE = 70% regular officers and men. Efficient and reliable.
A = 30% regular officers, 2% regular soldiers. Average.
B = 100% reservists commanded by generals recalled from retirement.

CURRENT POSITIONS AND COMPOSITIONS OF ARMIES

Game note: In order to keep the game manageable for the players, we have ignored the corps level of organisation, so each Army is simply composed of a number of divisions.

No.1 ARMY GROUP

1st Army

- 1 Active Infantry Division
- 3 'A' Infantry Divisions
- 3 Motorised Divisions
- 2 DLM Divisions
- 1st Air reconnaissance wing

2nd Army

- 1 Active Infantry Division
- 1 'A' Infantry Division
- 2 'B' Infantry Divisions
- 2 DLC Divisions
- 1 Cav Brigade
- 2nd Air reconnaissance wing

7th Army

- 1 Active Infantry Divisions
- 1 'B' Infantry Division
- 2 Motorised Divisions
- 1 DLM Division
- 7th Air reconnaissance wing

9th Army

- 2 Active Infantry Divisions
- 2 'A' Infantry Divisions
- 2 'B' Infantry Divisions
- 1 Motorised Division
- 9th Air reconnaissance wing

NO. 2 ARMY GROUP

3rd Army

- 1 Active Infantry Division
- 6 'A' Infantry Divisions
- 4 'B' Infantry Divisions
- 3rd Air reconnaissance wing

4th Army

- 1 Active Infantry Division

2 'A' Infantry Divisions
1 'B' Infantry Division

5th Army

4 'A' Infantry Divisions
3 'B' Infantry Divisions

Army Group Reserve - 1 'A' Division

NO. 3 ARMY GROUP

8th Army

1 Active Infantry Division
1 'A' Infantry Division
3 'B' Infantry Divisions

Army of the Alps

3 Mountain Divisions

Army Group Reserve- 1 'B' Division

Unallocated GHQ Reserve Units

6 Active Infantry Division
4 'A' Infantry Divisions
1 'B' Infantry Divisions
1 Motorised Division
3 DCR Divisions

Naval Units - 1 'A' Division

Abbreviations

DINA = North African Infantry Div

DLM = Light Mechanised Div

DCR = Heavy Armoured Div.

DLC = Cavalry Division

Forces in French possessions overseas :

French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria & Tunisia) - 10 Infantry Divisions and 2 Cavalry Brigades.

Corsica - 1 Infantry Division

Levant (Syria & Lebanon) - 2 Infantry Divisions

FOREIGN TROOPS

Foreign troops (Poles and Czech) forming on French soil:

Polish - 1st Grenadier Division

2nd Rifle Division

10th Armoured Brigade

3rd Infantry Division Currently forming

4th Infantry Division Currently forming

Czechoslovak - 1st Czech Infantry Division

AIR FORCE

PARIS : 1st Night Fighter Wing

ZOAN (Northern Zone)

Unit	Base	Notes
2nd Fighter wings	Rouen	
3 rd Fighter wing	Rouen	
4 th Fighter wing	Cambrai	
5 th Fighter wing	Calais	Navy co-operation wing
1 st Bomber wing	Soissons	
2 nd Dive Bomber wing		

ZOAE (Eastern Zone)

6 th Fighter wing	Toul
3 rd Bomber wing	Troyes

ZOAS (Southern Zone)

7 th Fighter wing	Chissey
4 th Bomber wing	

ZOAA (Mediterranean Zone)

8 th Fighter wing	Marseilles	Local defence of Med ports
5 th Bomber wing		

The following units are training in the south of France:

Operational by end of May 1940

- 9th Fighter wing
- 6th Bomber wing

Operational by the end of June 1940

- 10th Fighter wing
- 7th Bomber wing

Recce wings are deployed to air control at Army level.

Operational Radius

	Km
Fighter Wing	160
Bomber Wing / Recce Wing	1200

NAVY

The general disposition of Fleet in 1939.

	Battleships and battle cruisers	Aircraft carriers	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines
Channel	-	-	-	7	-
Bay of Biscay	-	-	-	3	-
Force de Raid	2	1	3	10	-
Mediterranean	3	1	10	48	53
Morocco	-	-	-	2	4
Far East	-	-	2	6	2
totals	5	2	15	76	59

NAVAL AIR SERVICE

The main combat strength lies in the modern squadrons earmarked to equip the new Carrier, or already equipping the Seaplane Carrier "Commandante Teste", and shore-based torpedo bomber squadrons. It should be noted that the Carrier is not yet built and "Commandante Teste" has landed its squadrons to act as an aircraft transport from America.

AERONAVALE

The French Navy operates its own aircraft from ships and ports. The following combat aircraft are also available:

Boulogne: 1 Bomber wing,

Cherbourg: 1 Fighter wing, 1 recce wings

Note also that the French Navy is entitled to expect the 5th Fighter wing to support it with land-based fighters from Calais.

In the event of war Aeronavale forces are likely to be fully engaged in protecting the fleet's naval operations and will be very unlikely to become available to support land-based operations.

Annex A

EXTRACT FROM GAME HANDBOOK

7. Orders

General

The contents of the orders you issue are, of course, very important. What will be even more important is how you write them. If the Team Control and other umpires do not understand you, then even the greatest tactical stroke in the annals of military operations will go for nothing.

To help you and the umpire team we have devised a standard order form. You will be issued with enough of these to last the day - please do not use them to mop up spilt tea or as scrap paper.

You will undoubtedly wish to amplify the broad orders given on your daily orders sheet - try and make your additional material short and simple.

Issuing Game Orders

The orders form (Annex A) does not attempt to emulate the layout of historical military orders - which at this level would have been both longer and more detailed.

Orders include an INTENTIONS section. You must circle one of the options. They mean the following:

- a. PREPARE. This is preparation for a formal attack. Preparation normally takes an entire day, during which time you may not be engaged in combat. Attacking without prior preparation is at a significant disadvantage. Preparation is specific – so the order will take the form of “*Prepare to attack and capture the city of Borchester*”. If the objective changes then preparation starts over again.
- b. ALL OUT = All Out Attack : The units will expend everything in the attack, probably attacking more than once a day, and expending most of their reserves of ammo etc. It will leave the unit much more 'tired' at the end, but its actions are briefly much more intense. Note the times taken to prepare given in Section 10.
- c. ATTACK = Attack : Deliberate assault on an enemy or position with the aim of destroying or defeating him. This is sustainable over a longer period, since not all reserves are consumed at once. Note the times taken to prepare given in Section 10.
- d. PROBE = Probe : A probe is a forward move to find or maintain contact with the enemy – without necessarily engaging in much combat. It is likely to be used during an advance to contact where you wish to avoid falling into an unwanted combat by accident. Intelligence will be gathered about any enemy units you encounter.
- e. HOLD = Remain in position. It is assumed that the units will adopt a basic defensive posture and dig in. The unit can prepare to attack whilst holding. This is the activity assumed if no orders are given for a unit.
- f. TACMOVE = Move Tactically : A move forward in bounds, with lead units prepared for combat. This represents the usual advance to contact speed. A unit cannot move and prepare to attack.
- g. Non Tac MOVE = Move Non-Tactically : A road-column move, with only rudimentary tactical deployment if any. If engaged whilst in this mode the unit has a very low chance of survival. It does, on the other hand, move much faster than the tactical move. A strategic move by rail is also, by definition Non-Tactical, as are the units being loaded or unloaded from trains. A unit cannot move and prepare to attack.
- h. REST = Unit takes leave, troops are rested and the unit 'stood down' from operations. A unit cannot move or fight while resting. It takes this opportunity to rebuild itself if badly battered. It takes one day to make ready for further operations after resting. A unit cannot rest and prepare to attack.

It is important also for ground units to include orders for Close Air Support if necessary. The Air command may have issued orders to the air units, but without complementary orders from the ground units it is assumed that the necessary cooperation was not achieved, and the close air support will be ineffective. It is up to players to ensure they get it right.

8. Logistics

In a game set at this level we will not be concerning ourselves too closely with the detail of logistics. So long as a unit can trace an unblocked path back to a major city of their homeland, they are probably ok. The combat umpires will rule as to whether a unit has been cut off, and players will be informed via their Team Control in the normal way.

Note also that all the armies have very long logistic tails. If, in manoeuvring armies, the 'tails' cross over, this will have a logistic effect as the supporting services get stuck in a long traffic jam.

The overall effect will be to delay most movement, but it can, in extreme cases, mean that units have lower combat effectiveness. The umpires will advise you as necessary.

9. Movement

General

Map references will be simplified, and you will not be required to give standard 6-figure references. The key thing is to make it clear where you are referring to. A position relative to a town is usually sufficient. Time Scale: Each move represents one day.

Ground

The main type of terrain represented on the map will be as follows:

Open : Open countryside, containing fields and small woods etc, with the occasional farm or small village. A reasonably dense road-net is assumed. No serious obstacle to movement of all types of troops.

Rough : Closer country, forest and or hills. A low-capacity road net and difficult terrain.

Low Country : As open country, but criss-crossed by canals and waterways and marshy or susceptible to flooding. A dense road net, but off-road movement for vehicles is very restricted.

Roads : Only the main roads are marked. These are very good quality and when clear will facilitate rapid movement. There are many minor roads which will not be marked on your maps, these are assumed to make little additional difference to the overall movement of units, and are factored into the movement rates used by the umpires.

Rivers : The rivers marked are usually wide, fast-flowing and are often difficult to cross. Not all crossing points have been marked. If a crossing has been marked is is a significant one and can easily support the logistic rear-echelons of an army. Minor (unmarked) crossings are usually of low capacity and will delay movement and are more easily interdicted.

Rates of Advance

As a guide only, absolute maximum movement speeds in km per day on your map are as follows:

Kilometres per day:

Unit type	Situation	Tactical move	Non-tactical move	River crossing delay
INFANTRY& FRENCH DCR ARMOUR	All terrain	10	30	1 day
FRENCH DLC, DLM & CAVALRY	Main Road	25	75	1/2 day on bridge
	Open	25	60	1 day to bridge using army assets
	Rough	20	45	n.a.
	Low country	15	60	n.a.
HQ	Main Road	75	150	1 Day
	Other terrain	50	120	n.a.

Movement can be interrupted or delayed by combat, enemy air activity etc.
Movement can be only at night, and it is at half the above speed, but is proof against air attack.

Motorised and armoured units make heavy use of roads. They have a vehicle 'tail' when moving (even when moving tactically) of 20km on a major road, or 40km on minor roads. This is made worse where the roads cut through rough or wooded areas, making passing and turning harder. There are obvious risks of traffic jams if complex manoeuvres are attempted with motor or armoured formations.

River Crossing

On the operational map only river obstacles of importance are marked. There are numerous minor obstacles which have been factored into the movement rates. Any river crossing not at the point of a major road crossing is assumed to involve Army bridging operations of some sort either to repair or strengthen minor bridges, and/or to add capacity.

10. Land Combat

Land Combat

We will be working on the following assumptions:

- ▶ Infantry have a slight advantage over tank formations when defending built-up areas or closely wooded country.
- ▶ Certain units were exceptionally heavily armed or well trained, and will be given a slight bonus in combat as a consequence.
- ▶ Armies are assumed to have their own supporting artillery, bridging and AA troops. All divisions operating within the Army gain a combat bonus for that support. Independent or detached divisions do not.
- ▶ ALL DIVISIONS MUST BE ATTACHED TO AN ARMY. Reserves held by High Command must therefore be allocated before they can be ordered into action. If not attached properly to a higher formation they will fight at a disadvantage - since the support of Army infrastructure is assumed in the combat calculations.
- ▶ It takes time to do anything. For the vast majority of units, the following timings apply:

To prepare a division/corps for an attack.	1 day.
Attach a division to a new corps/army.	1 day.
Load/unload a division on a train for strategic movement.	1 day.
Move a divisional-sized unit by train anywhere within the national rail network.	1 day.
Prepare an entire army for complete orderly withdrawal from its current position in the line	1 day.

Players must allow for these timings in their orders.

It is possible to attack unprepared, but this is regarded as very unlikely to be successful. Orders to prepare for an attack must be made on the order sheet.

Within guidelines such as these, the combat umpires will use their judgement as to the relative balance of advantage and disadvantage in each combat. No appeals on combat results will be accepted during the game - although you will have the opportunity to make comments at the end, and in the critique questionnaire.

Units will become progressively more tired as the battle goes on. The more often they fight, the lower their effectiveness. This is obviously made worse if they are losing. In extreme cases, units might disintegrate - this is especially the case with the poorer quality reserve units involved in heavy fighting.

Note that the vast majority of units in ALL the armies in this campaign are untested in battle. They are therefore particularly vulnerable to unusual or surprise events - they always need time to settle in.

11. Air Combat

Orders

Most air operational orders will emanate from Army Group level.

Since the vast majority of air operations on each side were flown in direct support of the ground forces it is intended that orders are issued in terms of air units supporting particular Armies or Divisions - or specific geographical points.

A specimen order form is at Annex B. Orders basically allocate resources to specific armies, with a mission profile.

Units

The basic unit is the Wing. The term 'Wing' had different historical meaning in different air forces. To keep a rather complex subject simple, we approximate the wing to a force of about 80-100 aircraft.

Air units can only conduct operations within a given radius of their base (see below)

Airfields

Airfields are separately marked on the map. In the context of the main game, new airfields will not be created.

Unit Types

Fighter – very good at attacking other aircraft, intercepting transport, bombers and ground attack.

Bomber – moderately good at supporting Land Combat attacks. Also good at attacking airfield capacity, logistics, lines of communication and terror bombing civilians.

Ground Attack – includes dive bombers. Particularly good at supporting Land Combat attacks.

Transport – moving troops and logistics from airfield to airfield.

Recce – Good at observing deployments of the enemy and major troop movements.

Mission Types

The types of Mission that can be flown, and the aircraft that can fly them, are as follows:

- ⦿ Combat Air Patrol (CAP) (Fighters only): Defensive air cover over a particular Army's area of operations. CAP does not guarantee to intercept every raid but the more fighters (and raids) the better the chance of doing so.
- ⦿ Escort (Fighters only): Represents the close escort to accompany a specific mission.
- ⦿ Close Air Support (CAS) (Ground Attack and Bomber only): CAS missions aim to apply a modifier to the ground combat and so orders must specify the Army to be supported. This support should be included in Army orders - and those orders will indicate the Corps and attack to be supported.
- ⦿ Bomb (Ground Attack, Bombers): attacking geographical locations or units beyond the immediate front line.
- ⦿ Transport (Transports): generally of air units to new airfields or small numbers of troops from airfield to airfield. It would take about 5 days to transport an infantry division (less its heavy equipment) from one airfield to another.
- ⦿ Recce (Recce): Reconnaissance of specific geographic area, looking for troop movements, concentrations etc. Generally best used behind enemy lines. Typically one recce wing can cover up to 4 map squares (map squares are 20km x 20km).
- ⦿ Move: Units can move from one airfield to another. This takes one day during which no combat missions can be flown.